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Sat 07 Nov 04:11 UTC
AI Toolsevaluationupdated 07 Nov 2026

T3MP3ST review

T3MP3ST is an offensive-security framework that connects an existing coding agent or a local model to security tools through a browser War Room, CLI, HTTP API and MCP server. It is intended for authorized testing. Its README explicitly says coordinated end-to-end swarm exploitation is unbenchmarked and still unreliable; our sandbox run covered repository commands, not a security mission.

Verdict

T3MP3ST's repository installed, built and passed 988 Vitest results in our sandbox, while npm audit reported 26 known vulnerabilities, including 1 critical. That supports further investigation by security engineers who can verify findings themselves. It does not establish mission reliability. Start with a bounded authorized lab task, and account for the release's explicit warning that Stop allows requests and tools already in flight to finish.

We ran it

Lab card: what happened when we ran T3MP3STScreenshot of T3MP3ST (github.com/elder-plinius/T3MP3ST)
Install✓ · 60s383 packages · 293 MB
Build✓ · 18s
Tests✓ · 31s988 passed · 0 failed of 988 (vitest)
Known vulns261 critical · 10 high · 15 moderate · 0 low (npm audit)
Repo1835 files~79,338 lines of source · 14 MB · 1 CI workflows · Dockerfile

Answers from our run

Does T3MP3ST build from source?

Dependencies installed in 60 seconds (383 packages), and the build succeeded in 18 seconds. We cloned commit 29824d5 into a clean Debian container with 3 CPUs and no project-specific setup.

Do T3MP3ST's tests pass?

Yes. The project's own test command finished in 31 seconds and reported 988 passed, 0 failed (vitest).

Does T3MP3ST have known vulnerabilities in its dependencies?

npm audit flagged 26 known advisories in the dependency tree, including 1 critical at the time of our run.

Who should not use T3MP3ST?

Teams requiring independently demonstrated coordinated swarm exploitation.

What are the alternatives to T3MP3ST?

Nuclei, PentestGPT. T3MP3ST's repository installed, built and passed 988 Vitest results in our sandbox, while npm audit reported 26 known vulnerabilities, including 1 critical.

SetupN/AInstallation, build and tests succeeded in the supplied sandbox run. Connecting a coding agent, configuring a local model and completing an authorized security task were not assessed, so an operating setup score would exceed the evidence.
DocsN/AThe supplied README explains onboarding routes and capability limits, and the release notes explain Stop semantics. We did not execute the documented onboarding workflow or assess the linked documentation as a whole, so no numerical documentation score is assigned.
CommunityN/AA supplied issue describes a mission-recovery race, but one report cannot establish support responsiveness or maintainer capacity. Repository metadata that previously blocked independent review has been removed from the article and final evidence list.
MaturityN/ASuccessful repository commands do not establish finding accuracy, agent containment or mission reliability. Upstream explicitly describes coordinated swarm exploitation as unreliable, and our run did not exercise a security workload.

Who it’s for

Security engineers evaluating agent-assisted work on systems they own or have written permission to assess.
Researchers who can compare reported findings with underlying tool output.
Operators prepared to test agent authority, cancellation and recovery in a bounded lab.

Who it’s NOT for

Teams requiring independently demonstrated coordinated swarm exploitation.
Operators who need Stop to terminate requests and tools already in flight.
Teams requiring demonstrated live-cloud or dynamic-mobile exploitation.
Teams requiring a clean dependency audit at the measured revision.

Setup reality

Our November 6, 2026 run at commit 29824d5 installed successfully in 60 seconds, recording 383 dependencies and 293 MB on disk. Build succeeded in 18 seconds. Tests succeeded in 31 seconds, with Vitest reporting 988 passed and 0 failed out of 988. npm audit reported 26 known vulnerabilities: 1 critical, 10 high and 15 moderate, with none low. The supplied measurement does not identify affected packages or deployed exposure.

The v1.0.0 release identifies the full source commit as 29824d5625ede419ac8cdae418c8f4c72c6270f7. Its release notes describe certification checks, but exclude optional live-provider and other external checks. Those upstream results are separate from our November measurement. The release's statement about zero reported vulnerabilities does not replace our later audit result.

The README documents connecting a local coding agent in War Room settings, configuring a hosted provider, or using a local model server. We did not execute these onboarding examples or complete an agent-backed mission. Reusing authentication does not establish that model usage is free.

The sandbox configuration specified 3 CPUs, 8 GB RAM and image lab-node:22. The image label does not establish actual runtime versions. The scan found Docker and Compose files and no standalone tests directory; the executed Vitest results establish that tests ran despite that directory scan.

Passing tests leave the mission question open

T3MP3ST's README says end-to-end swarm exploitation is unbenchmarked and still unreliable. Our successful repository run does not resolve that limitation. Security engineers can use this review to decide what to investigate in an authorized lab, but it provides no completed mission result.

The framework connects a coding agent or local model to security tools. Its documented interfaces include a browser War Room, CLI, HTTP API and MCP server. The README distinguishes components it labels stable from experimental operators and planned modules. Those labels describe upstream's assessment; we did not verify their operating reliability.

What happened when we ran it

We measured commit 29824d5 on November 6, 2026. Installation succeeded in 60 seconds, with 383 dependencies recorded and 293 MB on disk. Build succeeded in 18 seconds. The test command succeeded in 31 seconds, with Vitest reporting 988 passed and 0 failed out of 988.

The checkout contained 1,835 files, approximately 79,338 lines of source and 14 MB of repository data. The configured sandbox had 3 CPUs, 8 GB RAM and image lab-node:22. That label does not establish the actual Node or operating-system version, and these measurements do not describe the resources needed by a local model or a live assessment.

npm audit reported 26 known vulnerabilities: 1 critical, 10 high and 15 moderate, with none low. The supplied result does not identify affected packages or exposure, so it cannot establish exploitability or prescribe a remediation. Inspect the advisory paths for the revision and deployment you intend to use.

The scan found a Dockerfile, a Compose file and 1 CI workflow file. It found no standalone tests directory. The Vitest results establish that tests executed; the directory scan is not evidence of absent test coverage.

No agent connection, reconnaissance mission, verified finding or exploit execution accompanies these measurements.

The release checkpoint has explicit limits

The v1.0.0 release, released September 8, 2026, identifies source commit 29824d5625ede419ac8cdae418c8f4c72c6270f7. That matches the short commit recorded by our harness. The release describes deterministic certification checks and excludes optional live-provider, external Cybench corpus, PowerShell and hardware checks from those results.

Its statement about dependency updates with zero reported vulnerabilities belongs to that release report. Our November 6 audit reported 26. The packet does not establish the reason for the difference; the older statement cannot establish a clean audit for our run.

The release also states: Stop prevents new scheduling; requests and tools already in flight may finish. Treat Stop as a scheduling control with that documented limit. We did not test cancellation or independently verify the implementation.

Connecting an agent adds a separate trust decision

The README documents connecting an existing local coding agent through War Room settings. It also describes hosted-provider configuration and a local-model route. These are documentation examples, unexecuted in this review. Reusing an agent's authentication can avoid adding another API key, but it does not establish zero model cost or availability of every external security tool.

Claude Code session reuse is disabled by default. The README explains that a resumed session may retain provider-side context and ambient tool authority outside the Arsenal receipt boundary. It explicitly says the opt-in choice must not be treated as an Arsenal-enforced sandbox. Assess the connected agent's configuration as part of the execution environment.

Match the trial to what upstream claims

The README says its headline benchmark results came from a single agent, rather than the coordinated operator swarm. We did not reproduce those benchmarks. Recomputing verdicts from committed artifacts would also be a different exercise from rerunning the underlying workloads and validating findings.

Upstream labels live-cloud exploitation and dynamic-mobile exploitation as unbenchmarked. It describes white-box source analysis as experimental and some advanced modules as interface-only. If your required task depends on those paths, this review supplies no evidence that they are ready for it.

Issue 229, opened November 3, 2026, reports recovery returning failure or cancellation snapshots after a persistence write loses a compare-and-swap race. This is a reporter's reproduction, not a fault reproduced in our sandbox. It makes recovery a useful evaluation target; it does not establish that the measured release contains the reported fault.

We leave setup, documentation, community and maturity scores unassessed. The packet supports specific observations about commands and documentation, but not numerical ratings for operating quality. T3MP3ST uses AGPL-3.0; review the license before organizational integration.

Choose an alternative by the task

Nuclei uses YAML templates for vulnerability checks. Consider it when selecting explicit templates is the task you need to perform. PentestGPT documents saving and resuming penetration-testing sessions. Consider it when that session workflow fits your lab. Neither alternative was run here, so this is a workflow distinction without a comparative accuracy or reliability result.

For a first T3MP3ST trial, choose a small authorized target and retain the agent configuration, actual tool output and a finding another engineer can verify. Test recovery and the documented Stop behavior if your workflow depends on them. Those observations would answer questions the passing repository commands leave open.

Alternatives

ProjectWhat it isPick it when
Nuclei gh↗A vulnerability scanner using YAML templates.Consider it when your task is selecting explicit vulnerability templates for authorized targets. We did not compare its accuracy or reliability with T3MP3ST.
PentestGPTA penetration-testing and CTF agent whose README documents saved sessions.Consider it when saving and resuming agent sessions fits your evaluation. It was not tested here and is not an established reliability upgrade over T3MP3ST.

What people are saying

  1. [github-trending] elder-plinius/T3MP3ST

Sources

  1. T3MP3ST README
  2. Release v1.0.0 and pinned source commit
  3. Mission recovery report
  4. Nuclei README
  5. PentestGPT README

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